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Clearly  one  of the major public  policy  issues  of the  day relates  to
federal fiscal  policies in general,  and projected federal deficits in par-
ticular. We are a nation beginning to face the reality that we are living
beyond  our  means.  Whether  we  are  willing  to  do  something  about
deficits  is, however,  another matter.
It seems almost daily our elected officials are being admonished by
well  intended  groups  to  adopt  this plan  or  that  plan  to reduce  the
projected federal deficit.  At one and the same moment,  however,  over
7,200  federal  lobbyists  are  registered  to,  among  other  things,  safe-
guard traditional spending  in their areas of interest.  It is, therefore,
I  think,  appropriate  that your  conference  has  concentrated  on this
issue and concludes  with a presentation  of some factors  impacting on
possible future budget trade offs.
This paper is divided into two sections. In the final section I present
the more traditional analysis of budget trade offs - reviewing  where
the  federal  budget  stands  today,  where  it  is  headed  under  current
policies, and what that portends for possible deficit reduction decisions.
In the first section, however, I discuss budget trade offs from a slightly
less  orthodox  approach;  that  being  some  factors  underlying  broader
public policy trade offs which have evolved from our basic democratic,
political  economy.
The Democratic  Political Economy
The hard budget decisions that the Congress and the President must
address almost defy  categorization.  And because of this, I  am obliged
to cast a skeptical  note on the various deficit reduction proposals that
are  now  being  offered  by  elected  officials,  political  candidates,  and
public  policy  organizations.  For it  seems  to  me  that  the "emerging
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181issues"  are not really  new or necessarily  emerging  but go  to the  un-
derlying structure  and evolution  of our free,  democratic  political  eco-
nomic  system.  "The  issue  is  not economic,"  as  a  recent  Wall  Street
Journal  editorial  suggested,  "it's entirely  political"  [10,  p.  28].  The
basic political  difficulty  is  simply that  the  adverse  consequences  of
large deficits  will  not  be  felt until  some  future  time, but  correcting
deficits  creates pain now.
Further,  the politics  of the budget are  intertwined  with some  fun-
damental  principles  of our government,  such as: federal and state re-
sponsibilities;  private  and public rights;  economic  equity (social justice)
and  economic  efficiency;  access and nonaccess.
I believe almost  all current  day budget trade off debates  (and agri-
culture  policy formulation)  can fit  into these areas - and others ad-
mittedly  more  esoteric  but fundamental  to  our  democratic  political
system.  I now turn to a few of these broader trade  off issues.
Federalism:  Nationalism versus  States' Sovereignty
The  issue  of the  limits  of federal  power has  been a  central  one  in
the republic's  history.  Indeed,  before  the first year  of operation  was
completed  in 1790,  the issue  was joined in the historic  confrontation
between Hamilton  and Jefferson over the proposed establishment of a
national  bank.
Jefferson,  the strict constitutionalist,  argued that the national  gov-
ernment had no powers except such  as were expressly conferred  upon
it in  the  Constitution.  Hamilton,  on the  other hand,  contended  that
the national government had all powers which could by any reasonable
interpretation  be regarded as implied in the letter of the granted pow-
ers.
In the course  of time Hamilton's doctrine  of implied powers - sup-
ported  by  the  historic  1815  Supreme  Court ruling  in McCulloch  v.
Maryland - gained general  acceptance.  But certainly the debate con-
tinued, culminating  at one point in the devastating  Civil War fought
on  these surrounding farmlands.  The  failure of secession  in 1860-65,
and the acceptance  that a state cannot secede,  clinched the victory for
nationalism.  The  doctrine  not  only  gained  acceptance,  it  is  today
embedded  in  our constitutional  law.  As  one  historian,  however,  has
written:
"Never yet has the question been answered  at all points, nor in
truth can it ever be;  for in a dynamic,  changing society  govern-
mental powers  simply cannot be defined  and circumscribed with
such precision  and finality  as to prevent people  from construing
them differently  in the  face of new circumstances  and needs"  [5,
p.  59].
The expansion  of the federal government  (brought about in part by
the implied powers doctrine) is a subtle and yet key issue in the budget
182trade off debates of today. This is not necessarily  an emerging  issue,
but a long-standing  historic issue.
I hesitate to remind this audience that the Constitution says nothing
about "agriculture,"  and indeed the first Agriculture Adjustment Act
of 1933  was ruled unconstitutional.  I raise this only to highlight how
far agriculture  policy has come with the broader  definition of federal
responsibilities.
The issue of appropriate federal-state roles has been made even more
acute by the 1960's and 1970's, "a period," as Theodore  H. White has
observed,  "of goodwill gone awry." The Reagan administration's  New
Federalism  proposals  in  1982  proved  unacceptable.  But the  sorting-
out process of federal and state responsibilities will  continue and  un-
doubtedly  grow,  particularly  as  we  continue  on a  path  of prolonged
fiscal  stress, straining the resources  of each level  of government.
Private versus Public Rights
We Americans  fiercely value our independence.  This,  too, is not  an
emerging  issue but a long established part of our national  conscious-
ness.  The trouble  is, the frontier,  the country,  indeed  the world, has
shrunk  dramatically.  Similarly,  our food  and  fiber system  while  be-
coming  more  integrated  and concentrated,  also has shrunk  from the
perspective  of individuals and groups who now participate in food and
agriculture policy debates. Our independence has been challenged.  We
have become closely linked by advances in communication, technology,
and an interrelated world economy.
How,  for example, public policies  address the rights of the public to
a clean, safe, and healthy environment,  while at the same time protect
the rights of the free entrepreneur to invest, use advanced technology,
produce,  and succeed (or possibly fail), requires  some fundamental  re-
thinking of the trade offs  in our free economic  system.
In the area of agriculture, clearly public investments in agricultural
research  and technology  development  have  been  responsible  for  the
high  level  of productivity  in this  sector  over  many  decades.  But  as
former  Secretary  Bergland  has recently  observed,  "We  have a classic
collision  - private  versus  public interests.  There  is a  long-term  in-
terest  in conserving  soil and water,  for example,  but the private  in-
terest is immediate,  the public interest is long-term"  [9,  p. 8].
The emphasis today on public rights clearly influences budget trade
offs,  however difficult those rights are to define. This issue is integral
to the  recent  budget  clashes  over  environmental  laws, public  lands
development, and wilderness disputes.  More directly, the budget trade
offs in the area of public funds for agriculture  research have been and
will  continue  to  be  affected.  The  long  cherished  goal  of increasing
agriculture productivity and efficiency with public funds is being chal-
lenged when other agriculture  policy goals, such  as  limiting produc-
183tion, and other societal goals of the environment and consuming public
are included.
I see the private  and public rights issue  - along with the  issue  of
federal-state  roles - increasing  federal budget restraints  in agricul-
tural research and intensifying the geopolitical distribution  of federal
funds. This can only exacerbate the federal-state  conflict over research
goals and further  weaken federal funding for research having a truly
national benefit.
Economic  Equity and Economic  Efficiency:  Schumpeter versus Keynes
No  two  economists  better  represent  the  difficult budget trade  offs
today than do the two giants - Schumpeter  and Keynes. The critical
economic  and  budget  issues  we face  today have,  in  large part,  been
debated and analyzed  at great length by these brilliant men. Today's
budget debates would benefit greatly from a careful review of the dif-
ferent perceptions  of economic  theory  and  economic  policy  embodied
in their writings.
For it is my understanding  that Keynes,  through acceptance  of the
"symbol  economy"  of money and credit  (versus the "real economy"  of
goods  and  services),  believed  one  could maintain permanent equilib-
rium with full employment,  prosperity, and  stability with the manip-
ulation of certain parameters - government spending, interest rates,
the volume of credit, or the amount of money in circulation  [4]. Through
the achievement  of equilibrium,  economic  equity would  be  achieved.
Such  a  managed  economic  system  would  guarantee  the  transfer  of
national income to achieve  social justice.
Schumpeter,  on the other hand, insisted strongly that innovation is
the very essence of economics and most certainly of a modern economy.
For  him the  central question  of economic  policy  became  one  of how
capital formation  and productivity could  be maintained  so that rapid
technological  change  as  well  as  employment  could  be  sustained.  To
Schumpeter,  capital formation and productivity were needed to main-
tain the wealth-producing  capacity of the economy,  maintain current
jobs,  and create  new  ones. His was not a world  of static equilibrium,
but one  of dynamic  change  [7].
To  Schumpeter's  disappointment,  however,  to  be popular,  govern-
ment would  increasingly  become  the "tax state," would  increasingly
shift income  from producer  to nonproducer,  would increasingly  move
income  from  savings  for  future  capital  formation  to  consumption  in
the present.  Inflationary  pressures  would increase.
More recently Arthur Okun recognized the "trade offs" between eco-
nomic equity and economic efficiency  [6]. According to Okun, a society
that emphasizes  the elimination  of inequality would have  to pay the
price of diminished economic  vitality.
The deficits  we  face,  I  believe,  are adding a new element to future
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growth  is  likely  to continue  well  into  the future.  From  a  practical
viewpoint,  however,  unemployment  remains high,  relative to gener-
ally accepted  definitions  of full employment.  And the  distribution  of
income in  this country  is the unstated but fundamental  facet  of the
so-called "fairness issue" of today.  Therefore, the policy  makers' deci-
sions are one of risk acceptance  and avoidance.  How much is it worth
to reduce unemployment,  increase food stamps, or increase farm sub-
sidies if those actions involve  more  general price inflation?
The economic  efficiency versus economic  equity arguments will con-
tinue long  into the future.  For agriculture,  this means increasing at-
tention paid to farm price support programs.  A critical review of their
efficiency  in  achieving  price  stability while  also targeting  program
benefits to maximize economic equity will be integral to the final budget
decisions affecting  them.
Access  and Nonaccess
The right to petition the government is a fundamental  guarantee of
the First Amendment  of the Constitution.  I approach  the issue of ac-
cess  to the policy  making process,  therefore,  with  some  trepidation.
But it seems to me, that the role of lobbies,  lobbyists,  political action
committees,  and  - to  a  much  lesser  extent  - political  parties,  is
becoming more of an issue than ever before in the formulation of leg-
islation and, therefore,  budget trade  offs.  Balancing the role of these
groups  with  the  interests  of the  general  public  becomes  in  itself a
major trade  off.
The Friedmans have written in their new book,  Tyranny of the Status
Quo:
Special interest or single-issue politics are a frequent explanation
for  the growth in government.  A  government  program, particu-
larly at the federal level, almost always confers substantial ben-
efits on a relatively small group while at the same time spreading
the costs widely over the population.  As a result, the few have a
strong incentive to  lobby intensively for the program.  The many
don't even bother to inform themselves  about it, let alone to  de-
vote money and effort to opposing it [2, pp. 35-36].
The  growth in the number  of lobbyists has paralled the  growth  in
federal  spending  - today  there  are  over  7,200  lobbyists  registered
with  the Congress.  In the  area of agriculture  alone,  the number  of
registered  lobbyists (narrowly  defined  as having a particular  interest
in agriculture),  has grown  from less than  80  in  1960  to over  200  in
1983. Spending by these agriculture  lobbyists has similarly increased
from an estimated  $800,000 in  1960 to  over $5 million in 1983.
The  number  of registered  political  action committees  (PACs) have
similarly grown from about 600 in 1974 to over 3,500 last year. Their
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million  in  1972  to $83.6  million  in 1983.  Of the  top 20 PAC  contrib-
utors to federal candidates in 1972, three were affiliated with the dairy
industry  ranking  sixth,  eighth,  and tenth  in contributions  totalling
$780,000.  By  1983 only one dairy-affiliated PAC made the top 20 con-
tributors  list - the  Committee  for  Thorough  Agricultural  Political
Education,  affiliated with  Associated  Milk Producers,  Inc.  Its contri-
butions  exceeded $960,000.
Political  scientists that have  examined  the  role of these  groups on
the legislative  process  are  inconclusive  as  to their  impact. But what
does  seem to be a general  consensus is that their input into the polit-
ical system  has added to  growing fragmentation  and, therefore, their
presence makes it more difficult to reach a national consensus  on var-
ious issues.  Some,  of course, argue that in a pluralistic  society that's
not bad  [1,  p.  68].
Nowhere  has this fragmentation  been more  apparent  than  in the
budget arena in general,  and in agriculture  in particular.  The efforts
to slow government spending, beginning in 1980, have intensified com-
petition for a smaller pot of money as lobbyists have competed to safe-
guard their traditional spending  levels.
This  pressure  to  reduce  aggregate  spending  in  agriculture  has,  I
think,  lessened the  role of the historic farm  lobby interest groups -
the American Farm Bureau Federation; the National Grange; and The
Farmers'  Educational  &  Co-Operative  Union  of  America  (National
Farmers  Union)  - and increased  the  number of more  narrowly  de-
fined,  commodity  specific  lobby groups  such  as  the National  Wheat-
growers Association;  Dairymen, Inc.; and the National Cotton Council
of America.
The  intense  competition  for the  dwindling  federal  dollar  has  also
increased  regional  agriculture  disputes  - primarily  along  regional
commodity  lines.  But even  within the  same  commodity,  where there
are  differences  in  production  practices  (such  as  dual  cropping,  and
alternative  dairy technologies)  strong public  policy disputes  have be-
come  apparent these last few years.  I also unfortunately  observe, and
expect  it to grow,  intense regional  divergence between the water-rich
versus water-poor agricultural  states.
There  are  no  magic  answers  as  to  how  these various  groups  and
coalitions  will  impact  next  year's  farm  bill. Even  united  to  protect
traditional spending  levels, I believe they might fail.  I do think, how-
ever,  that the splintering  that has occurred  in the agriculture  com-
munity  could result in major budget reductions.  David Stockman,  in
the infamous December,  1981, Atlantic Monthly article, believed  budget
victories  over farm lobbies could be won by presenting Congress with
a farm bill that was so  unacceptable  to all farm  and food groups that
"the whole thing begins to splinter"  [3,  p. 35].
186In light of what  I perceive  to  be  a consensus  of agriculture  policy
scholars  for  some fundamental  changes in federal  farm price-support
programs as well as a general disenchantment with current programs
by both producers  and taxpayers, the continued warring of the special
interest agriculture  groups may bring on those changes  a lot quicker.
The Budget  and "Trade Offs"
Other participants in this conference have  discussed the deficit and
its consequences for  the general  economy  and agriculture  in particu-
lar.  I  will  try not  to duplicate  those  presentations,  but  simply  close
with a quick review of where budget trade offs might lie - once  you
overcome  or sort out some  of the political and philosphical issues I've
already discussed.
Deficit  Outlook/Structural Deficit
Chart 1 displays the projected growth in the total federal deficit as
estimated by the Congressional  Budget Office last month.  It does not
reflect  the  assumptions  embodied  in  the  Budget  Resolution  for  FY
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1871985 just adopted  by the Senate  yesterday,  but those  changes  would
not significantly alter the trends presented.
The  federal  deficit,  it  is  estimated,  will  increase  from  about  $183
billion this year  to  $278  billion  by the end  of the  decade.  As  a  per-
centage of the gross national product (GNP), the deficit remains about
5.0 percent throughout  this period,  down  slightly  from a high  of 6.4
percent  in  1983,  but  up significantly  from  the  low  of 2.7  percent  of
1981.  Total  debt held by the public  would increase  from about 36 per-
cent of GNP in 1984, to 46 percent of GNP by 1989.  This would be the
highest ratio of debt to GNP since the early 1960's.  By 1989  the total
public debt would be $3.1 trillion.
A  number  of economists  argue  that  an  annual  rate  of growth  in
nominal  GNP  that is  consistent  with price  stability  is  about  5  or  6
percent.  To keep federal  debt around its present GNP ratio of 36 per-
cent,  would  require  keeping  the  deficit  to  about  2  percent  of GNP.
Very simply this means  reducing spending, increasing revenues,  or a
combination  of the  two,  by  approximately  $100  billion  in  one  year
alone.
Total  federal  outlays  as  a  percentage  of  GNP  increase  slightly
throughout the period, averaging about 24.0 percent over the five year
projection period.  Revenues as a percentage of GNP also increase slightly
throughout  the  period,  averaging  about  19.2  percent.  It  is  this  4.8
percentage  point gap between  revenues  and spending that,  of course,
precipitates  the increasing deficit.
But what  is  more  disturbing  in  Chart  1 is  the underlying  strong
upward  trend in the structural deficit.  The structural  deficit is a hy-
pothetical  deficit  designed  to  eliminate  the built-in  deficit  increases
associated with swings  in the business  cycle.  Some refer to the  struc-
tural deficit as a high employment budget since it assumes a 6 percent
unemployment  rate.
What  Chart  1 so  graphically  depicts  is  the  concern  expressed  by
many that, even with  a period of sustained  economic  growth, the def-
icit will  continue to increase.  While the structural  deficit  will consti-
tute 63 percent  of the overall deficit in 1985,  it is projected to become
94 percent  of the  overall deficit by  1989.
We are not going to grow ourselves out of this problem. The problem
depicted by Chart  1 suggests  a long period of high real interest rates
and  a continued  shift in national  output toward  relatively more  con-
sumption and less investment.
Spending by  Major Categories
The  major budget trade  offs will  not be  fought  at a programmatic
level necessarily,  but within the much broader areas of revenues,  de-
fense,  entitlement  programs,  and  the  collection  of  remaining  pro-
grams.
188Chart  2 breaks  down the federal expenditures  into four major cat-
egories (excluding off-budget items such as REA and offsetting receipts
such as mineral and mining receipts from public lands). For the fiscal
year beginning in just a couple  of days (FY 1985) federal outlays will
reach approximately  $977 billion.  Of that total about 27 percent will
outlay  for  defense;  43  percent  for  entitlement  and  mandatory  pro-
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189grams;  17  percent  for  nondefense  discretionary  programs;  and  about
14 percent  for paying interest on the public debt.
Over the next four years, federal outlays will grow over 40 percent,
and reach $1.37 trillion in FY 1989,  assuming no  changes  in current
legislative  policies.  Defense  outlays will  increase  to about 30 percent
of total outlays;  entitlements  and mandatories  will  decrease  slightly
to 40 percent;  nondefense discretionary programs  will also decrease to
15 percent of total outlays; and net interest will increase to 16 percent.
The priorities reflected in the federal spending patterns  reflect cer-
tain trade offs this administration and the Congress  have established
among the various  categories.  These priorities  can and will undoubt-
edly change.  They also  reflect past patterns  of spending.  Chart  3,  as
an example,  breaks down the real rates of growth  for each of the par-
ticular categories,  along with total  outlays and revenues.  As  is clear
from this chart, while the period FY 1965-70 showed fairly comparable
real increases  in revenues  and outlays, major divergences  in the cat-
egories began  in the early  1970's with a negative  real rate of growth
in defense  and significant positive increases  in entitlement  and man-
datory programs.
In the current period FY 1980-85, a shift to a real increase  in defense
spending began,  and the rate  of growth  in outlays about doubled the
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190rate of growth in revenues.  But the fastest growing component  of the
budget both now,  and as projected to FY 1989,  is the federal payment
to service our growing debt.  This remains the real uncontrollable por-
tion of the budget and, from my viewpoint,  the most dangerous.
It is worth remembering that, while the federal budget consists  of
over  1,000  accounts  and many  more  specific  programs  within  those
accounts, when we array the various programs almost all of the spend-
ing is found in just a few areas.  Under current policy assumptions,  by
FY 1989 almost all the projected  federal revenues (97 percent) will go
to pay  for five  things - (1)  defense,  (2)  social  security,  (3)  Medicare,
(4)  Medicaid,  and (5)  interest on our public debt.  Of course  only four
of these  areas  are  subject  to real policy  manipulation,  interest  pay-
ments  being  basically  uncontrollable  except  for  what we  do  in  the
other areas.
Here,  within these four major areas,  are where the expenditure trade
offs realistically  have  to be fought.  Here,  the budget committees will
focus their attention.  Here are where the lobbyists are the strongest,
and the changing demographics  portends even strong lobbying in the
future.
I don't mean to diminish the importance budget restraints will have
in formulating future agriculture policy. But if you look at the relative
size  of farm  price  support  payments  (Chart  4)  to total  entitlements
spending in FYs 1985,  1989 (less than 3.0 percent) you can understand
why the major  focus will  be on these other areas.  In fact, I believe  a
convincing argument can be made that by addressing the federal  def-
icit in  these  larger  areas,  farm  price  support  payments  will decline
below the current policy  projections  as real interest rates decline  and
our agricultural  commodities become more  competitive worldwide.
Concerning the broader generic  public policy issues of federal-state
responsibilities,  economic  equity,  and  economic  efficiency,  to the  ex-
tent they impact on any one federal program, they impact on all. And
here I see an emerging theme that would impact on agriculture policy
formulation  - the  targeting  and  limiting  of federal  "middle-class"
subsidies  and  benefits.  Such  proposals  as  delaying  or  reducing  the
automatic  indexation  of the tax code  or  social  security program,  re-
stricting the types  of medical services  covered,  targeting  direct farm
payments to a specific  group of producers,  and imposing user fees for
particular  services will all increase in importance.
In the area of defense  spending,  major proposals to slow the rate of
growth are expected. But, I must note that even the recently released
Mondale  budget calls for  a 3.0 to 4.0 percent real  increase in defense
spending through  1989. Not a whole lot different than the 5.0 percent
real growth  that was  assumed in  the last two  Congressional  budget
resolutions.  "Providing for the common defense"  remains a clear and
stated function  of the federal government.
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The issue of defense spending and the allocation of resources within
the defense budget is complicated by a wide array of issues. The issues
relate  to differing perceptions  of world threats  and alternative deter-
rence strategies  to deal with those threats.  The budget trade offs within
the  defense  area  relate  to alternative  strategic  defense  and conven-
tional force readiness strategies. While defense spending will increase
- if for  no other  reason than  the pipeline  is full  of obligations  and
awarded contracts - still,  by FY 1989,  defense  spending will consti-
192tute  about  7.6  percent  of GNP,  a  comparable  figure  to FY  1965.  I
believe reductions  can  be achieved  in the defense  area, but those re-
ductions will in no way reduce the projected deficits by the magnitude
of figures being discussed.
Revenue
Finally, the other part of the deficit equation besides spending is, of
course,  revenues.  There  are  basically  three  options:  raise tax  rates,
broaden the existing tax base,  or introduce  new taxes. While there  is
a  growing national  consensus  for simplifying  and  reforming the tax
system,  the consensus  for additional  federal tax revenues  is not  en-
tirely clear.  Most of the major tax reform proposals  being discussed,
such as Bradley-Gephardt,  Kemp-Kasten,  and the Siljander  10 percent
flat tax, are  intended by their sponsors  to be revenue neutral.  Other
comprehensive  federal  consumption  tax proposals  such as  a national
sales tax  or value added  tax, while  clearly  raising federal revenues,
are unlikely to receive quick enactment.
This leads me to conclude that the trade off between long-term  tax
reform  measures  and the short-term  need for  revenue  will result  in
pressure  to enact  both marginal  changes  in the existing  tax  code  to
broaden the income base and new federal  excise and user fee  taxes.
It is not clear how many  more "tax loopholes"  can  be closed. What
can  be  identified  and is likely to  be  carefully  reviewed,  however,  is
the wide array of tax expenditures  - special  exclusions,  exemptions,
credits, deductions,  and preferential tax rates - which will total over
$370.0 billion this year.  For agriculture this means defending special
rules for deducting  certain items before the income  from them  is re-
alized,  supporting cooperative's  deductions for "patronage  dividends,"
and justifying the wide  array of special  agriculture  depletion  allow-
ances  while  at the same  time other public  programs  are  attempting
to conserve  those same natural resources.
Major short-term revenue measures that are likely to be considered
by the Congress involve some  modification to the tax-indexation  pro-
visions  due  to  go into  effect  in January  or  the implementation  of a
short-term  surtax.  Of particular  concern  to  agriculture,  however,  is
the increasing  attention being given to a  simple broad-based  energy
tax.
Conclusion
I end where I began - there is no end to the number of possibilities
for correcting  our growing  budget deficit.  Where the political  will ex-
ists the problem can be solved. According to a recent survey of farmers
in Oklahoma  and Illinois  conducted by Tweeten, farmers  are willing
to make some sacrifices  in terms of commodity programs to lower the
federal  deficits [8].
193The question is, are the other 227 million Americans willing to make
similar  sacrifices?
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